United States

The simple gesture of pointing can greatly augment one’s ability to comprehend states of the world based on observations. It triggers additional inferences relevant to one’s task at hand.We model an agent’s update to its belief of the world based on individual
observations using a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), a mainstream artificial intelligence (AI) model of how to act rationally according to beliefs formed through observation. On top of that, we model pointing as a communicative act between agents who have a mutual understanding that the pointed observation must be relevant and interpretable. Our model measures “relevance” by defining a Smithian Value of Information (SVI) as the utility improvement of the POMDP agent before and after receiving the pointing. We model that agents calculate SVI by using the cognitive
theory of Smithian helping as a principle of coordinating separate beliefs for action prediction and action evaluation. We then import SVI into rational speech act (RSA) as the utility function of an utterance. These lead us to a pragmatic model of pointing allowing for contextually flexible interpretations. We demonstrate the power of our Smithian pointing model by extending the Wumpus world, a classic AI task where a hunter hunts a monster with only partial observability of the world. We add another agent as a guide who can only help by marking an observation already perceived by the hunter with a pointing or not, without providing new observations or offering any instrumental help. Our results show that this severely limited and overloaded communication nevertheless significantly improves the hunters’ performance. The advantage of pointing is indeed due to a computation of relevance based on Smithian helping, as it disappears completely when the task is too difficult or too easy for the guide to help.

CogSci 2021

Individual vs. Joint Perception: a Pragmatic Model of Pointing as Smithian Helping

Join us for CogSci2022! Our 44th Annual Conference will be centered around the theme of diversity, with an accompanying range of keynotes and invited speakers who themselves highlight the diversity of our field. Our three symposia are Cognition across Diverse Populations, Cognition within Diverse Societies, and Global Challenges for Cognitive Science. The conference is being offered in a fully hybrid environment for onsite and online attendees.
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<br>[**The Program at a Glance can be found here**](https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Cogsci-2022-PAAG-Detailed-July-12final-1.pdf)
<br>[**The Detailed Program can be found here**](https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/DeArmond-CogSci2022-program-v113-final.pdf)
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CogSci 2022

The 44th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society highlighted research on the theme Cognitive Diversity in addition to the full breadth and diversity of research topics offered by the society’s membership. 





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### Looking for Cogsci 2023? Please [click here](https://underline.io/events/405/reception) to switch to 2023 edition.


**Dear Colleagues,**

Welcome to the 43rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society! 

This year’s conference brings together the latest research from all Cognitive Science and also highlights this year’s theme **Comparative Cognition: Animal Minds.** 

The program features four plenary speakers: Friederike Range (University of Veterinary Medicine, Vienna), Onur Güntürkün (Ruhr University Bochum), Julia Fischer (University of Göttingen), and Erich Jarvis (The Rockefeller University). The keynotes and invited symposia showcase the broad spectrum of ideas that encompass the conference theme of comparative cognition. 

Further, the program includes the Rumelhart Prize keynote presentation by Susan Goldin-Meadow (University of Chicago), and symposia to celebrate the winner of the Elman Prize: Wei Ji Ma (New York University), the Heineken Award winner Robert Zatorre (McGill University), and the Robert J. Glushko Dissertation Prizes session.

The program committee for CogSci 2021 received 1,025 submissions, including 710 full papers, 275 member abstracts, 8 publication-based talks, as well as 15 proposals for symposia, and 17 for workshops and tutorials. After a rigorous review process, the committee selected 152 papers for oral presentation and inclusion in the conference proceedings (14.8%), 332 papers for poster presentation and inclusion in the proceedings (32.4%), and 175 papers for poster presentation with inclusion of abstracts in the proceedings (17.1%) We also selected 275 submitted member abstracts. In addition, we accepted 6 publication-based talks, 12 symposia, and 9 workshops and tutorials to make for an exciting and inclusive program.

We hope that you enjoy the conference this year!<br><br>

**Your Program Chairs,**
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**Learn more about the Vienna Cognitive Science Hub at the University of Vienna, hosts of CogSci 2021**

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To review the proceedings for the conference or review the searchable program, please visit the [website](https://cognitivesciencesociety.org/program/).


The Cognitive Science Society brings together researchers from around the world who hold a common goal: understanding the nature of the human mind. The mission of the Society is to promote Cognitive Science as a discipline, and to foster scientific interchange among researchers in various areas of study, including Artificial Intelligence, Linguistics, Anthropology, Psychology, Neuroscience, Philosophy, and Education. The Society is a non-profit professional organization and its activities include sponsoring an annual conference and publishing the journals Cognitive Science and TopiCS.

How do humans adapt when others exploit patterns in their behavior? When can people modify such patterns and when are they simply trapped? The present work explores these questions using the children's game of rock, paper, scissors (RPS). Adult participants played 300 rounds of RPS against one of eight bot opponents. The bots chose a move each round by exploiting unique sequential regularities in participant move choices. In order to avoid losing against their bot opponent, participants needed to recognize the ways in which their own behavior was predictable and disrupt the pattern. We find that for simple biases, participants were able to recognize that they were being exploited and even counter-exploit their opponents. However, for more complex sequential dependencies, participants were unable to change their behavior and lost reliably to the bots. Results provide a quantitative delineation of people's ability to identify and alter patterns in their past decisions.

Humans fail to outwit adaptive rock, paper, scissors opponents

In many situations where people communicate (e.g., Twitter, Facebook etc), people self-organise into ‘echo chambers’ of like-minded individuals, with different echo chambers espousing very different beliefs. Why does this occur? Previous work has demonstrated that such belief polarisation can emerge even when all agents are completely rational, as long as their initial beliefs are heterogeneous and they do not automatically know who to trust. In this work, we used agent-based simulations to further investigate the mechanisms for belief polarisation. Our work extended previous work by using a more realistic scenario. In this scenario, we found that previously proposed methods for reducing belief polarisation did not work but we were able to find a new method that did. However, this same method could be reversed by adversarial entities to increase belief polarisation. We discuss how this danger can be best mitigated and what theoretical conclusions be drawn from our findings.

What interventions can decrease or increase belief polarisation in a population of rational agents?

From the ambient auditory environment, infants identify which communicative signals are linked to cognition. By 3 to 4 months of age, they have already begun to establish this link: listening to their native language and to non-human primate vocalizations supports infants’ core cognitive capacities, including object categorization. This study aims to shed light on the specific acoustic properties in these vocalizations which enable their links to cognition. We constructed a series of supervised machine-learning models to classify those vocalizations that support cognition from those that do not, based on classes of acoustic features derived from a collection of human language and non-human vocalization samples. The models highlight a potential role for spectral envelope and rhythmic features from both human languages and non-human vocalizations. Results implicate a potential role of underlying perceptual mechanisms relevant to spectral envelope and rhythmic features in infants’ establishment of the uniquely human language-cognition link.

Which acoustic features support the language-cognition link in infancy: A machine-learning approach

Individuals increasingly participate in online platforms where they copy, share and form they opinions. Social interactions in these platforms are mediated by digital institutions, which dictate algorithms that in turn affect how users form and evolve their opinions. In this work, we examine the conditions under which convergence on shared opinions can be obtained in a social network where connected agents repeatedly update their normalised cardinal preferences (i.e. value systems) under the influence of a non-constant reflexive signal (i.e. institution) that aggregates populations' information using a proportional representation rule. We analyse the impact of institutions that aggregate (i) expressed opinions (i.e. opinion-aggregation institutions), and (ii) cardinal preferences (i.e. value-aggregation institutions). We find that, in certain regions of the parameter space, moderate institutional influence can lead to moderate consensus and strong institutional influence can lead to polarisation. In our randomised network, local coordination alone in the total absence of institutions does not lead to convergence on shared opinions, but very low levels of institutional influence are sufficient to generate a feedback loop that favours global conventions. We also show that opinion-aggregation may act as a catalyst for value change and convergence. When applied to digital institutions, we show that the best mechanism to avoid extremism is to increase the initial diversity of the value systems in the population.

Synchronising the emergence of institutions and value systems: a model of opinion dynamics mediated by proportional representation

A longstanding question in cognitive science concerns the learning mechanisms underlying compositionality in human cognition. Humans can infer the structured relationships (e.g., grammatical rules) implicit in their sensory observations (e.g., auditory speech), and use this knowledge to guide the composition of simpler meanings into complex wholes. Recent progress in artificial neural networks has shown that when large models are trained on enough linguistic data, grammatical structure emerges in their representations. We extend this work to the domain of mathematical reasoning, where it is possible to formulate precise hypotheses about how meanings (e.g., the quantities corresponding to numerals) should be composed according to structured rules (e.g., order of operations). Our work shows that neural networks are not only able to infer something about the structured relationships implicit in their training data, but can also deploy this knowledge to guide the composition of individual meanings into composite wholes.

Compositional processing emerges in neural networks solving math problems

The QAnon conspiracy posits that Satan-worshiping Democrats operate a covert child sex-trafficking operation, which Donald Trump is destined to expose and annihilate. Emblematic of the ease with which political misconceptions can spread through social media, QAnon originated in late 2017 and rapidly grew to shape the political beliefs of millions. To illuminate the process by which a conspiracy theory spreads, we report two computational studies examining the social network structure and semantic content of tweets produced by users central to the early QAnon network on Twitter. Using data mined in the summer of 2018, we examined over 800,000 tweets about QAnon made by about 100,000 users. The majority of users disseminated rather than produced information, serving to create an online echochamber. Users appeared to hold a simplistic mental model in which political events are viewed as a struggle between antithetical forces—both observed and unobserved—of Good and Evil.

Rise of QAnon: A Mental Model of Good and Evil Stews in an Echochamber

Same-different visual reasoning is a basic skill central to abstract combinatorial thought. This fact has lead neural networks researchers to test same-different classification on deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs), which has resulted in a controversy regarding whether this skill is within the capacity of these models. However, most tests of same-different classification rely on testing on images that come from the same pixel-level distribution as the testing images, yielding the results inconclusive. In this study we tested relational same-different reasoning DCNNs. In a series of simulations we show that DCNNs are capable of visual same-different classification, but only when the test images are similar to the training images at the pixel-level. In contrast, even when there are only subtle differences between the testing and training images, the performance of DCNNs could drop to chance levels. This is true even when DCNNs' training regime included a wide distribution of images or when they were trained in a multi-task setup in which training included an additional relational task with test images from the same pixel-level distribution.

Can Deep Convolutional Neural Networks Learn Same-Different Relations?

Research on discrimination-based transitive inference (TI) has demonstrated a widespread capacity for relational inference in people and non-human animals. In this domain individuals learn to choose the reinforced item in a set of interrelated discriminations (e.g., A–/B+; B–/C+) and are tested for transitive inference on novel, non-adjacent pairs (e.g., A vs. C). Existing models suggest that transitive responding can be supported by associative learning mechanisms, but they fail to account for evidence that knowledge about the hierarchical nature of the task, whether instructed or discovered during training, has a dramatic influence on learning. I present a model which formalizes TI as the estimation of items’ positions along a latent dimension and tracks learners’ uncertainty about the mapping between item position and feedback. The model naturally accounts for standard effects in TI, while going beyond associative models in explaining the effects of knowledge and rich feedback on relational inference.

Capturing uncertainty in relational learning: A Bayesian model of discrimination-based transitive inference

People often fall victim to decision-making biases, e.g. short-sightedness, that lead to unfavorable outcomes in their lives. It is possible to overcome these biases by teaching people better decision-making strategies. Finding effective interventions is an open problem, with a key challenge being the lack of transfer to the real world. Here, we tested a new approach to improving human decision-making that leverages Artificial Intelligence to discover procedural descriptions of effective planning strategies. Our benchmark problem regarded improving far-sightedness. We found our intervention elicits transfer to a similar task in a different domain, but its effects in more naturalistic financial decisions were not statistically significant. Even though the tested intervention is on par with conventional approaches, which also struggle in far-transfer, further improvements are required to help people make better decisions in real life. We conclude that future work should focus on training decision-making in more naturalistic scenarios.

Encouraging far-sightedness with automatically generated descriptions of optimal planning strategies: Potentials and Limitations

“Similarity” is often thought to dictate memory errors. For example, in visual memory, memory judgements of lures are related to their psychophysical similarity to targets: an approximately exponential function in stimulus space (Schurgin et al. 2020). However, similarity is ill-defined for more complex stimuli, and memory errors seem to depend on all the remembered items, not just pairwise similarity. Such effects can be captured by a model that views similarity as a byproduct of Bayesian generalization (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). Here we ask whether the propensity of people to generalize from a set to an item predicts memory errors to that item. We use the “number game” generalization task to collect human judgements about set membership for symbolic numbers and show that memory errors for numbers are consistent with these generalization judgements rather than pairwise similarity. These results suggest that generalization propensity, rather than “similarity”, drives memory errors.

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